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The paper proposes a continuous time model of an FX market organized as a multiple
dealership. The model reflects a number of salient features of the Czech koruna spot market.
The dealers have costly access to the best available quotes. They interpret signals from the joint
dealer-customer order flow and decide upon their own quotes and trades in the inter-dealer
market. Each dealer uses the observed order flow to improve the subjective estimates of the
relevant aggregate variables, which are the sources of uncertainty. One of the risk factors is the
size of the cross-border dealer transactions in the FX market. These uncertainties have diffusion
form and are dealt with according to the principles of portfolio optimization in continuous time.
The model is used to explain the country, or risk, premium in the uncovered national return
parity equation for the koruna/euro exchange rate. The two country premium terms that I
identify in excess of the usual covariance term (a consequence of the “Jensen inequality effect”)
are: the dealer heterogeneity-induced inter-dealer market order flow component and the dealer
Bayesian learning component. As a result, a “dealer-based total return parity” formula links the
exchange rate to both the “fundamental” factors represented by the differential of the national
asset returns, and the microstructural factors represented by heterogeneous dealer knowledge of
the aggregate order flow and the fundamentals. Evidence on the cross-border order flow
dependence of the Czech koruna risk premium, in accordance with the model prediction, is
documented.
JEL Codes: F31, G11, G29, D49, D82.
Keywords:  Bayesian learning, FX microstructure, optimizing dealer, uncovered parity.
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Nontechnical summary
The ability (also known as uncovered parity) of national asset return differences to reflect
exchange rate expectations has proven to be crucially dependent on the assets and market
segments used to empirically verify the theoretical result. The disparity between the foreign cash
return and the domestic-foreign asset return differential, called the country-, or risk-, premium,
turns out to be poorly explained by standard macroeconomic variables. A deeper insight into the
asset price formation mechanism is needed to capture the properties of the observed country
premium.
In the present paper, the analysis of the risk premium in the CZK/EUR currency pair is
undertaken by combining standard international stochastic finance theory with foreign exchange
market microstructure methods. The analysis acknowledges the fact that the koruna’s exchange
rate against the euro does not emerge in an abstract Walrasian market environment. Instead, it is
being set by a finite number of market-making dealers who conduct FX operations with customers
residing both inside and outside the country. A representative portion of these transactions is
executed by domestically licensed dealer banks for non-resident market users. When one takes
this microstructural information into account, it becomes possible to uncover the dependence of
the seemingly non-stationary risk premium in the CZK/EUR exchange rate on the cross-border
order flow in the interbank FX market.
The methodology used leans on the conjecture – supported by informal evidence collected in
Czech-resident dealer banks – that an FX dealer objective is a part of the overall portfolio-
optimizing behavior of the dealer’s bank. Therefore, we model an international portfolio-
optimizing market maker whose information, fully in the spirit of microstructure finance theory,
comes from the orders placed by his clients. In the course of executing the clients’ orders and
placing own orders in the inter-dealer market, the dealer learns about both the fundamental
properties of the koruna- and euro-denominated assets and the direction in which funds are being
moved between them on aggregate. The dealer’s information is never perfect, but his rational
Bayesian learning leads to a gradual reduction of the error and hence to the convergence of the
exchange rate return towards the standard uncovered parity behavior.
The contribution of the paper to the literature consists in demonstrating that:
a)  the observed exchange rate properties depend upon the prevailing market microstructure;
b)  the flow of FX orders between differently-endowed and informed investors is responsible
for the exchange rate deviation from uncovered parity, not for the exchange rate as such;
c)  FX market makers need information on the aggregate direction of the fund transfer
between currencies and do not need to form beliefs about the statistics of the exchange
rate itself.Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   3
1. Introduction
The paper addresses the issue of modeling the exchange rate risk premium structure in the
formula for uncovered parity of national asset returns, for a currency with a known FX-market
structure. The model developed for this purpose reflects some salient features of the spot inter-
dealer market with the Czech koruna and is applied to the data on its exchange rate against the
euro. I demonstrate that the forex microstructure has an impact on the dynamics of the risk
premium, by linking the behavior of the latter to
1)  the order flow received by domestic resident dealers from other market users,
2)  errors in the dealers’ assessments of the aggregate cross-border order flow and economic
fundamentals.
The constructed continuous time model allows one to address two types of FX-market effects.
The first is the “long-run” properties of the exchange rate, such as a (generalized) uncovered
parity or competitive quoting by multiple dealers around a clearing price. The second group,
referring to information extraction procedures and Bayesian belief updating by participants in the
inter-dealer market in the face of changing fundamentals, is more short-run in nature. Combining
the said objectives, I use the model to derive a “dealer-based” uncovered parity of national asset
returns with respect to the expected exchange rate return. This parity theorem contains a country
premium term that depends on the order flow from non-resident market users to resident dealers.
One term in the premium is present under both perfect and imperfect information and comes from
liquidity needs caused by dealer heterogeneity. The other term arises as a consequence of
imperfect information of an individual dealer about the aggregate order flow and national asset
return statistics. Bayesian learning and belief updating by the dealers then leads to long-lasting
shifts in the country premium.
The obtained result generalizes the uncovered parity property of the exchange rate that comes up
naturally in any optimizing model of international asset pricing. (Under the Walrasian market
clearing assumption, this uncovered parity would follow from the international consumption-
based CAPM.) We call it the Uncovered Total Return Parity (UTRP), to make a distinction from
the much-compromised uncovered interest rate parity of naïve no-arbitrage models. The UTRP
associates the exchange rate expectations for a given period with the difference in total returns
(instantaneous dividend over price plus capital gain) on a pair of representative securities. These
total returns coincide with yields to maturity in continuous time. Accordingly, the return quoted in
a secondary market and not the money market loan/deposit rate, which is pre-determined for the
time interval in question, constitutes the continuously updated measure of the expected move in
the exchange rate (see Derviz, 2002, for details, including an empirical verification of the UTRP).
This parity theorem would be valid exactly and permanently in a Walrasian auctioneer setting,
which ignores microstructure, with a representative agent and markets clearing at each moment.
However, when one studies the exchange rate formation in a dealership market, deviations from
the fundamental UTRP come about as a natural consequence of agent heterogeneity. These
deviations reflect information and inventory flows between dealers and investors. The proposed
model establishes a link between an individually observed order flow, Bayesian filtering of
imprecisely known fundamentals by the dealer, and the seemingly unwarranted variability of the4   Alexis Derviz
country premium in the UTRP formula. The model predicts that deviations from the UTRP should
be most pronounced at times when some dealers are learning new information from their clients
through the observed order flow. During such periods:
1)  the exchange rate and the inter-dealer order flow variability must be higher than under
complete symmetric information;
2)  dynamic processing of new signals by the dealers leads to deviations from the UTRP that
persist until the new information has been absorbed; under certain circumstances, Bayesian
learning by the dealers can lead to a permanent revision of the country premium level in the
uncovered parity relation.
In this sense, the model describes situations in which the order flow effects are long-lived.
To highlight the “right” price discovery process, starting with the end-users of the foreign
currency (investors) and going through the dealers who learn from them, the existing
microstructure literature usually makes a conceptual distinction between clients and dealers. This
happens both in the single-dealer sequential trade models of Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, or
Easley and O’Hara, 1987, with a single risk-neutral market maker, and in multiple-dealer models
of the Evans and Lyons, 2002, type. This distinction is barely possible in practice. More
importantly, the real-life roles of the investor and dealer in the FX market are often combined in
the performance of cooperating units within the same company. Most typically, a major
commercial or investment bank has dealers who service its customers and participate in the inter-
dealer market, but it also operates proprietary trading desks that exercise FX transactions for the
needs of its own portfolio management. Access to electronic cross-border security trade and
information systems is not a privilege of dealers either: the community of Reuters and/or
Bloomberg quote-screen users includes a considerable part of the internationally active companies
of very versatile profiles. Access to these facilities becomes highly attractive to any company
whose cross-border operations attain a certain size. Accordingly, most of the available price and
trade-size data carry no stamp of the purpose of any given FX transaction.
One of the exceptions in the literature in terms of client–dealer separation is the paper by
Madhavan and Smidt, 1993, in which a dealer is also an active investor. Similarly to Madhavan
and Smidt, I model a synthetic dealer-investor. All agents in the present model are market users.
They can be either local, trading only with one selected dealer, or global, having access to the
inter-dealer market. That is, global market users are able to both search for the best dealer quotes
and exercise a trade with the dealer of their choice. The only distinction between dealers and the
rest of the global market users is that the former assume the market-making function. Apart from
that, dealers have the same intrinsic motive to hold foreign currency positions as any other market
user, since they are active in the same lines of international business as the latter. The respective
roles of local and global market users in the model can be roughly summarized as follows: the
order flow of the locals creates noise and can generate exogenous asymmetry in dealer positions;
the order flow of the globals acts as a signal that transmits information between dealers.
1
                                                          
1 This understanding of the aggregate signaling effects of the market users’ order flow can be supported by
reference to the model of Bernhardt and Hughson, 1997. There, customers split orders between dealers to
equalize the marginal benefits from trade at different pricing schedules. The implicit equalization of marginalComponents of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   5
The majority of information-oriented forex microstructure models define the signals as unbiased
estimates of some “true” or “fundamental” value of the exchange rate. This feature was inherited
from microstructure studies of other markets (e.g. equities, where this true value is associated with
revealed earnings or dividend data). However, in the case of exchange rates, no such revelation of
absolute truth exists. Instead, I let the signals reaching the dealers contain information about the
“other side of the market”, i.e. the aggregate behavior of the received trades initiators. This allows
us to close the model in a natural way. I am modeling neither pure “information” nor pure
“inventory” motives for trade, but rather an “information about inventory” motive.
Another highly stylized feature of the existing models of the inter-dealer market is the strict
sequencing of information-laden events in them. (Cf. Evans and Lyons, 2002: first a round of
dealer trades with customers signaling fundamental information, then an inter-dealer round to
redistribute inventory risk between dealers, then another round of customer trades to unwind open
positions.) On the contrary, data on the FX trades of a given financial institution reflect three
simultaneously evolving random processes pertaining to own investment needs, inter-dealer
operations and customer–dealer operations. In other words, at each moment, the dealer observes
the three named categories of transactions simultaneously and has to exercise a belief update
based on these observations. Under such conditions, a continuous time stochastic model of dealer
behavior appears to be the most convenient.
A non-negligible argument in favor of a continuous time dealer model with diffusion uncertainty
is its better analytical tractability compared to discrete time models with arbitrary statistics of risk
factors. There already exists a line of literature that develops the findings of the Kyle, 1985, risk-
neutral market maker model in continuous time. For example, Back, 1992, Back and Pedersen,
1998, and Back, Cao and Willard, 2000, work with price and cumulative orders in a security
market (applicable to forex) in semimartingale form, with diffusion components originating in the
action of noise traders. When one considers optimizing models for risk-sensitive agents, the
stochastic maximum principle becomes an even more powerful tool for analyzing the equilibrium
price and order flow dynamics in continuous time, once the dealer optimization problem is
properly defined in this setting. The crucial challenge here is to identify and interpret the
information asymmetry and Bayesian belief updating phenomena and their role in the obtained
solutions.
2 This task in a continuous time portfolio model of the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross type with
heterogeneous beliefs was first addressed by Detemple, 1986. Zapatero, 1998, used the same
approach to derive results on asset price volatility under asymmetric information in continuous
time.
Since each dealer has a local customer base that trades with him exclusively, there is enough
space for a non-trivial bid-ask spread in his quotes. The adverse selection reason for the existence
of spreads identified in most models with informationally heterogeneous traders, namely the
compensation of losses from trades with the informed by profits made in trades with the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
benefits is the reason why, in our model, the global market user order flow observed by one dealer contains
information on the order flow received by other dealers as well.
2 The previously mentioned continuous time models of security trade by Back and colleagues are based on
Kyle’s auctioneer and do not include dealers explicitly. Moreover, these models abstract from the usual
Brownian asset return uncertainties faced by an investor and concentrate on the market interpretation of narrowly
defined exogenous signals about the asset value.6   Alexis Derviz
uninformed, is implicitly present in this setting as well. The role of the informed is played by the
global traders, while that of the uninformed is played by the local traders. The latter, when they
trade at given spreads, are subject to the exercise of monopoly power by their dealer. This
understanding is close to the ideas of Copeland and Galai, 1983, and Perraudin and Vitale, 1996.
However, the present model generates non-trivial – and variable – bid-ask spreads even when
there is more than one dealer in the market. The existence of global investors extends the
competition from pure inter-dealer interaction to the area of dealer–customer relations.
The existence of informational heterogeneity between investor groups of different residences is
pivotal in generating non-trivial order flows and additional sources of exchange rate volatility in
our model. This type of heterogeneity has already found reflection in the finance literature. For
instance, Brennan and Cao, 1997, argue that asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors
in the knowledge of domestic asset returns has an impact on the direction and volume of cross-
border equity trade. More specifically, a working paper by Seasholes, 2000, argues that large
foreign investors in emerging markets have an informational advantage and cash in higher returns
on domestic equity, compared to the majority of domestic investors. (Therefore, cross-border
informational asymmetry does not always mean an advantage for residents.) Our model shares the
Brennan and Cao view that residency-based informational heterogeneity matters, but also allows
for differences in informational endowments between local and global investors, in accordance
with the Seasholes conjecture.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the implications of the general model for
the Czech koruna case and provides evidence on the empirical validation of the theoretical result.
Section 3 describes the model variables, the structure of uncertainty and the dealer’s optimization
problem (Subsection 3.1), after which the optimal dealer strategies for passive (at own quotes) and
active (at other dealers’ quotes) FX trades are derived (Subsection 3.2). (Proofs of the
corresponding technical results are given in the Appendix.) I also show how a non-zero bid-ask
spread and a competitive mid-quote arise as a result of dealer optimization. Section 4 analyzes the
long-run FX transaction price dynamic resulting from the uncovered total return parity. Section 5
discusses order-flow interpretation and updating of beliefs by dealers, leading to deviations from
the uncovered parity of returns. Section 6 concludes and indicates possibilities for future research.
2. Summary of the results and their application to the Czech koruna
market
2.1 The “dealer-based” uncovered return parity and its implications
Most macroeconomic models of exchange rate formation, if they are microeconomically founded,
result in a property of the exchange rate relating it to the difference in the representative returns
on domestic and foreign assets:

0 *
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In the above formula, s is the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, yt+1 is the domestic
asset return between periods t and t+1, and 
*
1  t y  is the foreign asset return between the same dates.
Et denotes the expectation conditioned on public information at date t. This relation is the
Uncovered Total Return Parity (UTRP, cf. Derviz, 2002) mentioned in the introduction. The
UTRP is derived in a Walrasian market with no explicit market structure and no FX trades in
equilibrium. If one conducts the analysis to be discussed in Sections 3–5 for a model of a
multiple-dealer FX market, the obtained uncovered parity will be different from (1). Although the
model to be introduced is in continuous time, it is possible to formulate a discrete time analogue,
which can be tested if the appropriate data are available. Specifically, for the model of this paper,
one arrives at the equation
 1
1 0 *
1 1 1          t t t t t a a y y s E  . (2)
Here, t+1 is the cross-border (i.e. between non-residents and residents) inter-dealer order flow
between dates t and t+1. It has a plus sign when non-residents sell korunas against the euro on
aggregate, and a minus sign in the opposite case. Equation (2) is the discrete-time counterpart of
the full symmetric information continuous time dealer-based uncovered parity formula (19), to be
derived in Section 5. This means that (2) should prevail when all market participants are aware of
the correct statistical model for the macroeconomic fundamentals and also know the true law of
motion of the aggregate cross-border FX order flow. If information were imperfect or asymmetric,
additional terms would appear in (2), corresponding to errors and learning.
The model application requires a specializing assumption on the statistical law of . Accordingly,
(2) is valid under the assumption that this order flow process is of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck type
(i.e. mean-reverting to zero). This would correspond to non-explosive behavior of the major
koruna market participants at times when massive “bandwagon” speculative attacks do not take
place (our time span and sample do not include such episodes).
Clearly, the impact of the –term in (2) on the exchange rate expectation is intuitively correct: the
currency (CZK in this case) is expected to depreciate when non-residents initiate more of its sales
against the euro than purchases, and appreciate when they initiate more purchases than sales.
The next subsection gives some empirical evidence on the possibility of explaining the CZK/EUR
country premium by cross-border order flow proxies.
2.2  Empirical evidence on the dealer-based uncovered exchange rate parity for the
Czech koruna
An interpretation of equation (2) in empirically observable terms would mean that one verifies
both the general symmetric information UTRP stated in Section 4 (when (2) is satisfied) and the
dealer asymmetry-based explanation of deviations from it discussed in Section 5 (when it is
violated). Carrying out the said verification involves:8   Alexis Derviz
A.  finding the right model for residuals;
B.  defining a rule to calculate the average ex post exchange rate change over a given period;
C.  choosing the representative domestic and foreign assets with returns y and y
*.
Task A presumes discrete time sampling of Itô equation (19), which typically leads to ARMA
residuals instead of the desired i.i.d. ones. On the other hand, accommodation of ARMA terms in
formal regressions often happens at the cost of reduced explanatory power by the original right-
hand-side variables. At present, the best solution seems to be preliminary filtering of the highest
frequencies in the exchange rate, the asset return and the aggregate order flow series. These high
frequencies correspond to the diffusion terms in the continuous time parity equation.
Task B, in practical terms, means fixing a time horizon over which the uncovered parity will be
tested, and a smoothing/averaging procedure over the chosen horizon for the observed exchange
rate movement series. As it turns out, the best-performing smoothing horizons vary between one
and six months, depending on the analyzed currency pair and the historical period covered by the
sample. Once the horizon is picked, the exact choice of averaging procedure does not play a
decisive role. At the same time, there are episodes when the UTRP seems to break down for fixed
horizons, manifesting itself instead as a co-integration of the exchange rate level with the return
differential. Differently from outright UTRP-violations, most of which can be explained within
the present model, such episodes require the analysis of typical holding periods of the given
assets, and are left out of the present discussion.
From the point of view of Task C, long-maturity government bonds proved to be the best
instruments for UTRP analysis. The examples given below refer to ten-year bonds as the most
widespread category to be found in all the examined economies.
Extensive coverage of both the model and the practical aspects of UTRP testing can be found in
Derviz, 2002. Here, to give a general idea of the performance of this concept, I will comment
briefly upon the results for two currency pairs: U.S. dollar/euro and Czech koruna/euro. The main
finding for both is the very satisfactory performance of the UTRP for the exchange rate changes
over the 3M and 6M horizons for a number of sampling periods between 18 and 24 months long
on daily data. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the results. The ex post moving slope of the nominal
exchange rate logarithm 3 (6) months ahead of the current date is taken as the smoothing statistic
mentioned above.
Even the simple Walrasian symmetric information UTRP stated in (1) can be roughly consistent
with the data for as long as one to two years in a row. Longer periods are clearly inappropriate for
the UTRP-type reasoning, while the evolution of the disparity (country premium) term in multi-
annual samples cannot be ignored. Fig. 3 shows the data for the $/DM exchange rate between
Spring 1996 and Spring 2001, 3M exchange rate difference smoothing horizon. The data indicate
that there occur regular episodes of disparity term revision. Every such episode is eventually
followed by restored validity of the UTRP, but it is impossible to make a single equation such as
(2) comply with the whole sample at once.
Our theoretical model predicts that the order flow from non-residents to residents is able to
explain a part of the country premium. It is well matched by the data on the cross-border inter-Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   9
dealer CZK-EUR flows that are available from the balance sheets of the FX dealer banks
operating in the Czech koruna market. Fig. 4 shows the disparity term as the difference between
the smoothed CZK/EUR rate change (3M smoothing) and the Czech–German government bond
differential (i.e. the difference of the two series featured in Fig. 2). This time series is compared to
the aggregate net euro-for-koruna purchases of the local Czech dealer banks from the foreign
resident partners (clients and dealers). The latter is our proxy of . As Fig. 4 demonstrates, the
correspondence is at times very close.
3 Another qualitative prediction, backed by the data, refers
to the recurring episodes of violation of the standard UTRP. (One such episode concerns the
USD/EUR rate starting in Summer 2000, Fig. 1; a number of shorter and less pronounced UTRP-
deviations of the CZK/EUR rate are visible in Fig. 2.) The model attributes these violations to
dealer-investor learning.
Having provided the rationale behind modeling the CZK country premium with explicit elements
of the market microstructure, we now go over to the rigorous definition of the theoretical model
and the formal derivation of the quantitative results.
Figure 1:  US/EMU 10Y benchmark bond yield differential, 3M- and 6M-moving average of




















































6M log-exchange rate slope 3M log-exchange rate slope yield differential (right-hand scale)
                                                          
3 Rigorous econometrics adds little to this outcome of visual inspection and is not commented here.10   Alexis Derviz
Figure 2: Czech-German 10Y benchmark bond yield differential, 3M- and 6M-moving average
























































6M log-exchange rate slope 3M log-exchange rate slope yield differential (right-hand scale)
Figure 3:  Germany-US 10Y government bond yield differential and the 3M-moving average
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Figure 4: Net cross-border order flow (foreign currency purchases) and deviations from
































































disparity/country premium net FC purchases, dealers and non-residents
3. The investor-dealer decision problem
3.1 The model
The world is split into a home country with legal tender M and a foreign country with legal tender
I. We take the exchange rate to be the price of I in terms of M. Investors residing in the home
country account their operations in M, while those residing in the foreign country use the
accounting unit I.
4 Among the investors (of both residencies), there is a subset of those who offer
forex dealer services to the others. That is, they agree to provide an ask quote p
a, which is the
price at which they agree to sell I in exchange for M, and a bid price p
b, at which they agree to
buy I in exchange for M. We will call them investor-dealers, or simply dealers. Each dealer has a
local customer base of those investors who only exercise FX trades through him at given quotes
(they are free to vary the traded quantity from zero to infinity depending on the quotes they see).
Alongside them, there are other (global) investors who are able to search for the best quote among
all dealers, at a cost. Each dealer also has the ability of costly discovery of the best quote among
other dealers. One would expect the investor-dealers to face a lower quote-search cost than
investors without a dealing capacity. On the other hand, the non-dealer investors have priority in
learning news about fundamentals, to be discussed in Section 5. This balance between the costs
and benefits of market making should provide an intuitive justification for the existence of dealers
in the model. In the case of a small FX market (e.g. a European currency not belonging to the
                                                          
4 The present model accommodates the Jensen inequality-related properties of the expected exchange rate returns
(it will be free of the residency-based asymmetry of the latter arising in naïve no-arbitrage settings, also known
as Siegel’s paradox). See Derviz, 2002, for the details of Siegel’s paradox resolution in optimizing models.12   Alexis Derviz
eurozone, or an emerging economy currency), one can loosely associate global investors with
multinationals and international financial corporations present in the local economy.
Altogether, the order flow that a dealer observes consists of three parts. The first is the supply of I
or demand for I from his local customers, dependent only on his own quote values p
a and p
b and
the economic fundamentals influencing the customer base. This flow is unobserved by other
parties. The remaining two order flow components come from the inter-dealer market. These are
the orders of those (a) global investors and (b) other dealers whose quote search has resulted in
the choice of this dealer for the desired trade in the given period. For every party involved,
participation in the inter-dealer market is a source of information update about the statistics of the
fundamental variables and the market-wide order flow, read off the received trades. The inter-
dealer market is only partially transparent in the sense that each participant only observes his/her
own trades, whereas the knowledge of standing best quotes is the result of a costly search for each
outgoing trade. These search costs are a part of the overall transaction costs (to be defined below).
One can think of an agent with access to electronic and voice brokers who service parts of the
market, but who is not sure whether a better price could be found by approaching certain dealers
individually. While not modeling these tradeoffs between a broker and individual search
explicitly, we adopt the understanding that the best price can always be found, even if the
resources dedicated to the search grow faster than the desired transaction amount.
The international investor exercising the function of an FX dealer will be modeled as an agent
characterized by four state variables. These are: x
0 – domestic cash holdings, x
d – holdings of the
composite domestic asset, x
i – foreign cash holdings, x
f – holdings of the composite foreign asset.
The domestic asset pays out a random rate of return dr
d in M-units. I also assume that maintaining
the investment portfolio x
d requires continuous inputs of funds (management costs) without which
the value x
d deteriorates at a stochastic rate d
d. (This is done for the sake of convenience,
allowing one to consider equilibria with constant average levels of asset holdings.) Let one unit of
x
d cost X




f respectively (the latter price is in I-units).
Cash holdings x
0 and x
i earn their own rates of return dr
0 and dr
i respectively. In the simplest
variant, this can be the overnight money market rate (or its proportional part if the elementary
period is intra-day). More realistically, one should include in the cash variables the inter-bank
loan/deposit positions and FX swap positions. In that case, dr
0 (dr
i) is the instantaneous rate paid
in the domestic (foreign) money market on the corresponding portion of x
0 (x
i), i.e. the generator
short rate of the domestic (foreign) term structure.
For any strictly positive Itô process z,  dz/z will be shortened to  z d

. The drift and diffusion
coefficients of the asset return and price processes introduced above will be denoted as follows:
dZ I dt i dr
d d  
0 ,  dZ I dt i dr
f f i   ,  dZ N dt n dr
d d d   ,  dZ N dt n dr
f f f   ,
dZ A dt a d
d d d    ,  dZ A dt a d
f f f    ,
dZ dt X d
d d d    

,  dZ dt X d
f f f    

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Since it is not the purpose of this paper to study GARCH or other non-constant variance effects in
asset prices, all the diffusion coefficients I, N, A and  are assumed constant.






f belong to the exogenous sources of uncertainty in the
model. These processes, together with two more to be introduced later in Subsection 2 and
Section 5, are assumed to be locally L2-integrable on [0,∞) with respect to the physical probability
Pr, and generate the information filter F=(Ft)t0. The latter must be augmented by all Pr-null sets.
All the considered stochastic processes will be adapted to F (for every t, Ft denotes the partition of
the event space corresponding to full information about the operation of the markets; the
probability measure Pr is defined on Ft for all t.) Let the diffusions adapted to F be spanned by a
vector Z of mutually independent standard Brownian motions.
Current FX transaction price
We have assumed that the global market users (dealers or not) are allowed to search in the inter-
dealer market for acceptable quotes. Next, we introduce the notion of the best attainable bid and
ask prices for a given dealer, P
b and P
a, good for one unit of I. Trade size-dependent non-
linearities will be accommodated by means of convex transaction costs (see below).
Assumption 1
For each global investor and each dealer, the best individually attainable (highest) bid price is
equal to the best attainable (lowest) ask price: P
b= P
a=P, i.e. the inside spread/touch is zero.
Although, in reality, the touch is positive, it is very small under normal circumstances (i.e. unless
the markets become turbulent). Goodhart et al., 1996, observe that interdealer FX spreads on
major currency pairs are usually as tiny as 1 pip, or 1/10 of a basis point, for standard amounts.
These are the numbers reported by the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system, i.e., the
inside spreads, giving a perfect match with assumption 1 (which just sets the minimal “technical”
touch amount to zero for simplicity).
On the theoretical side, the inside spread diminishing with the number of competing dealers is one
of the outcomes of the model by Ho and Stoll, 1983. Their model also predicts that the spreads of
individual dealers will not fall to zero even when their number becomes large. This is in line with
the results to be obtained in the present paper. More generally, the intuitive justification of
assumption 1 is related to the information-dissemination ability of the modeled competitive inter-
dealer market. If one observed P
b >P
a, then there would be a clear arbitrage opportunity. In the
opposite case P
b< P
a, there would be no inter-dealer trades at all until the too-high asks went
down and/or the too-low bids went up to meet each other and provide gains from trade to those
who seize the opportunity. There will always be an agent who discovers the deadlocked market
and undercuts/overbids the standing quote in his favor. As soon as all the arbitrage and market
share appropriation possibilities have been exhausted, there remains a group of inter-dealer
market sellers and another group of buyers. They transact at the mutually acceptable price P. The
buyers’ ask price and the sellers’ bid price quotes are non-competitive: above P in the first group14   Alexis Derviz
and below P in the second. Therefore, the buyers do not have to sell and the sellers do not have to
buy.
5
The dealer population is split into sellers and buyers at every given moment. One reason why
someone becomes a seller and someone else a buyer is the heterogeneity of asset endowments.
Even in the absence of the latter, there is a possibility of differences in privately accounted net
returns on assets between dealers. For instance, foreign residents may have a handicap with regard
to domestic asset management, including noisy information on returns, taxation or profit
repatriation costs, and vice versa. Domestic dealers may enjoy privileged access to the domestic
money market, with a resulting higher return on domestic cash balances, and a symmetric
advantage may be enjoyed by foreign residents with respect to foreign cash. All these factors can
be exacerbated by heterogeneity of beliefs (see Section 5).
The last-observed inter-dealer transaction price P will be identified with the market price. It is the
one used in the dealer’s accounting. Each agent views it as a strictly positive Itô process.
Investment performance measure
For the later purpose of defining preference over the paths of investor-dealer’s actions, we
introduce a notional dividend rate  to be accounted for in every infinitesimal period dt. In the
context of high-frequency data (i.e. a very short time step), the defined dividend rate will be
understood as an imaginary infinitesimal contribution of the dealer department to the dividend
fund of the firm, whose integral, in reality, is being withdrawn from the cash balance at discrete
intervals. Having this infinitesimal dividend rate in the model is a convenient way to make the
dealer accountable for the ultimate performance of the forex activity of the firm, and, at the same
time, bring the preference structure of the agent close to the standard portfolio optimization
setups.
Price search costs
In order to generate non-trivial supply and demand schedules (for instance, Glosten, 1989, uses
non-linear pricing schedules in his investor-dealer game in both monopolistic and competitive
dealer settings), it is usual to define transaction costs that grow in a convex way with respect to
transaction volume. It is well known that the observable transaction costs incurred by a big real-
life investor, let alone a dealer, are usually negligible for small/standard amounts, but grow
rapidly when the trade size exceeds the standard. Accordingly, non-linear pricing schedules are a
reality. In addition, some form of generalized transaction costs seems to lie behind the dealer
behavior, even if these costs are not readily measured. In this paper, we take the view that these
costs include the cost of a quote search in the inter-dealer market. Specifically, let us assume that
in order to buy/sell a volume v
idt of I at market price P (which is the last observed highest bid if
v
i<0 and the last observed lowest ask if v
i>0), one pays/receives Pk(v
i)dt units of M. Here, k is a
strictly increasing and strictly convex function with  1 ) 0 (   k . A natural example would be a
quadratic function of the form
                                                          
5 Thus, the present model incorporates the observation by Silber, 1984, that dealers are typically competitive on
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k(v)=v+k0v
2/2.
For consistency reasons, one should assume the same search cost mechanism to be present in the
two other market segments as well. That is, if amounts v
d and v
f of the domestic and foreign asset
are purchased per period (sold if negative), the M- and I-balances are reduced by amounts
X
d dt v k
d ) (  and X
f dt v k
f ) (  respectively.
The dealer’s order flow
As was mentioned in the introduction, it is difficult to obtain separate data on the customer and
inter-dealer components of a dealer’s order book. Instead, we distinguish between the local
customers of the given dealer (who neither have access to nor exercise FX trades with others) and
the participants of the inter-dealer market. Both the global investors who search among available
dealer quotes and dealers themselves belong there. Accordingly, the pair of ask and bid I-prices
p
a, p
b announced by the dealer will service everyone at the moment of announcement. However,
we assume that the dealer is able to distinguish between a locally riskless (non-diffusion) demand
D(p
a)dt, a locally riskless supply S(p
b)dt, and a random flow, which can go both ways,
x
0dP=x
0(ldt+dZ)/P, generated by Itô process  with drift l and diffusion . Altogether, the
accounted change in the dealer’s M-balance, induced by trades at his quotes, is equal to
            d x dt p S p p D p dZ ldt x dt p S p p D p
b b a a b b a a 0 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  , (3)
while the corresponding change in the I-balance is
          d
P
x
dt p D p S dZ ldt
P
x
dt p D p S
a b a b
0 0
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  . (4)
Observe, in particular, the last diffusion terms in (3) and (4), coming from the diffusion part of :
x





 . They reflect the dealer’s uncertainty about the order flow from both global
investors and other dealers. Indeed, one can generate the dealer’s diffusion-type order flow as a
limit of two small-interval discrete flows of very small purchases at p
a and very small sales at p
b
with a non-zero degree of randomness in the direction of the trade and its exact magnitude. Then
the drift parts of the limit flows will correspond to the demand and supply that are certain during




























) ( , where l
a+l
b=l.
The diffusion part reflects the remaining uncertainty. Considering the dealer an M-resident, we
account for the random order flow in M-terms by expressing it as a stochastic growth rate of the16   Alexis Derviz
M-cash account x
0. It can be shown that the I-position in that case evolves exactly as is shown by
the last term in equation (2).




1 0   in the drift
component of the order flow is explained by the possibility of probability revision by the dealer
(the drift change in  in accordance with the Girsanov theorem, see Elliott, 1982). The
consequences of such a probability measure change in the case of a Bayesian update of beliefs
will be discussed in Section 5.
If the dealer were a foreign resident, the uncertain parts of the order flow that she faces would be
xi-proportional, and the certain FX supply- and demand-entries in equations (3), (4), coming from
the local customers, should be modified accordingly.
Summing up the definitions given above, we come to the following system of state-transition
equations for the state vector x=x0,xd,xi,xfT of an international investor with the dealer function
(with domestic residence):
 dt p S p p D p dt v Pk dt v k X dt dr x dr x dx
b b a a i d d d d ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0 0 0        
 dZ ldt x   
0 , (5a)
dt v d x dx
d d d d     ,   (5b)
  dZ ldt
P
x
dt p D p S dt v dt v k X dr x dr x dx
a b i f f f f i i i         
0
) ( ) ( ) (,   (5c)
dt v d x dx
f f f f     . (5d)
Preferences
The introduced continuous time model is intended to be applicable to high-frequency – such as
daily or intra-day – data. With such short time steps, it is not obvious whether a time
preference/discount factor of the standard optimization models is applicable. Earlier, the dividend
rate  in equation (5a) was defined as an instantaneous contribution to the dividend fund, to be
integrated over a finite time period. Let there exist a function u satisfying the conventional growth
and concavity conditions, such that u() measures the period utility (of the shareholders) derived
from receiving contribution  to the dividend fund. Similarly, the infinitesimal rates dr and d of
asset return and deterioration in the model can be understood as the per-period contributions to the
integral expected returns over a finite period (the drift parts) and unexpected innovations in these
integral returns (the diffusion parts). Accordingly, an instantaneous time preference rate can be
defined as an infinitesimal contribution to an integral discount factor valid for a finitely distant
period in the future. Another possibility to be exploited here is to understand this rate, denoted by
, as the parameter of a Poisson “death” process. The present model does not require a dealer to
close the FX position in a predetermined finite time, nor does it rely on the existence of an
exogenous final/underlying value of the currency. Instead, the following construction will replace
                                                          
6 The said transition to the limit of discrete processes is a generalization of the well-known procedure of
generating a geometric Brownian motion as a limit of random walks with a drift, when the step size goes to zero,
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the artificial shortcut of the “true liquidation value under discovery” often utilized in
microstructure models.
For each time moment t, the dealer will have to close down his forex trade business within the
next time interval dt, with probability 1-e
dt, and liquidate the outstanding engagement in currency
I at current prices. The result of liquidation, i.e. the balance x
0+Px
i, is evaluated by means of a
strictly increasing and concave exit (or bequest) utility function G. As a result, at any time t the
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s s p p v v v s , , , , ,   , s≥t, subject to (5), given the current
values xt of asset holdings. Note the appearance of parameter  in front of G in the integrand in
(4). Since in each period ds the firm liquidates with probability 1-e
-ds, the expected utility derived
from the liquidated position is equal to
 ds G ds G
ds
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If the dealer resides abroad, her liquidation balance entering G will be accounted for in I-units and






. In either case, we shall assume that G decreases to -∞ when cash balances
become increasingly negative. Then, the presence of G in the period utility prohibits negative cash
bubbles of Ponzi type, accomplishing the same objective as the transversality condition of
traditional models.
3.2 Optimal policies of the dealer
Following the results of the Appendix, we can characterize the solution to the problem (5), (6) by
means of the shadow prices  of the four held assets, which are the adjoint processes of the
problem appearing in the maximum principle. Given the Hamiltonian of the problem, as
calculated in the Appendix, the optimal actions of the dealer are characterized by the following
first-order conditions:
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p S p 
   is the price elasticity of the local I-supply, both observed by the
dealer.
Further, according to the adjoint (Euler) equations stated in the maximum principle of Appendix
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If a dealer resides in the foreign country, she faces shadow prices whose laws of motion must be a
symmetrically adjusted version of (8), in accordance with her units of account. In other words, in
equations (8a)–(8d), one must switch the index pairs (0,d) and (i,f). Also, the term analogous to
dZ and other terms containing  will appear in equations (7c), (7d) instead of (7a), (7b). Only the
quote-setting equation (7e) remains as it is.
Spread



















b are high, the log of the right-hand side of (9) is approximately equal to
b a  
1 1
 . The conjecture about the high price elasticities of demand and supply on the side of theComponents of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   19
dealer’s customer base seems justified, since the customers are not facing a unique dealer-
monopolist. It is reasonable to assume that as soon as the disadvantage of trading with a
monopolist or monopsonist becomes too evident, a customer can always try to look up another
one, i.e. turn “global” despite the associated costs. In the sequel, I will assume the existence of a






 for all customer bases.
Equation (9) would be a standard outcome in any monopolist two-way market maker problem,
regardless of the presence of uncertainty. The two less standard elements of the present model are:
time-variable and stochastic spreads, and the equilibrium paths of dealer quotes that reflect
information about fundamentals, to the extent the latter is disseminated by other parties’ actions
(see Section 5 below). The latter feature is achieved by considering a competitive inter-dealer
market.
The laws of motion (8) of the shadow asset prices characterize them in terms of the fundamental
variables of the defined economy. These fundamentals in the present model comprise various
components of the total asset returns (dividends, price movements, depreciation rates), plus a
variable which characterizes the aggregate flow of I-funds to/from the domestic dealers (to be
defined in Section 5). The fundamental information accessible to different groups of market
participants can have different quality. The possibilities for modeling information dissemination
processes with regard to fundamentals within the present approach will be discussed in Section 5.
But first, to establish that dealer quotes reflect the processed information on fundamentals
competitively (thereby reducing monopolistic welfare loss effects), it is necessary to deduce a
number of properties of the possible market equilibria. This is done in the next section.
4. Shadow price parity, uncovered parity of total returns, and the
asymptotic dynamic of the exchange rate
The first-order conditions of optimality (7) can be used to state a fairly general property of the
exchange rate dynamics, which we call the generalized uncovered total return parity condition.
The underlying property of equilibrium in the asset markets is the same as the one that leads to the
consumption-based CAPM. A similar result would be obtained in most international portfolio
optimization models. In contrast to the very much discredited uncovered interest rate parity of the
textbooks, the total return parity enjoys enough empirical support (see Derviz, 2002, for a model
and empirical verification; another approach with more data on leading currencies can be found in
Nadal-De Simone and Razzak, 1999.)
To formulate the result, it is necessary to define the total instantaneous rates of return on the
domestic and foreign asset. In this model, the return rate is the sum of the instantaneous
coupon/dividend rate relative to the current price, dr/X, the capital gain dX/X, less the depreciation
rate d:
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Variable Y can be called the shadow price parity index. The reason is the fact that, according to
Itô’s lemma applied to equations (8b) and (8d) for the shadow prices, its stochastic differential
satisfies the following property:
Adt P d dR dR Y d
f d    
 
. (10)
Here, A (the disparity term) is the sum of a number of covariance terms (which come about as a
consequence of Itô’s lemma). They are usually small and, according to our assumption on the
constancy of diffusion coefficients of exogenous variables, A is a constant.
The first three terms on the right-hand side of (10) define the uncovered parity of total returns
(UTRP) for the exchange rate P. Namely, if Y were a constant and the disparity term A close to
zero, then the relative expected change in P between times t and t+dt would be equal to the total
return differential. Thus, the uncovered return parity can be formulated as the equality of the
exchange rate return to the instantaneous return rate differential between representative domestic
and foreign securities plus a covariance term:
Adt dR dR P d
f d   

. (11)
Note that (11) is symmetric with respect to the residence country of the investor. In other words,
this uncovered parity, as opposed to the traditional uncovered interest rate parity, is free of Jensen
inequality effects (Siegel’s paradox).
7
A priori, there is no reason to consider the shadow price parity index as a constant. Instead, by
introducing the shortening notations  ) (
d d v k k   ,  ) (
i i v k k   ,  ) (
f f v k k   , we can derive from






If the markets were characterized by the existence of a representative agent with no dealer–
customer distinction (and the clearing prices were set by a Walrasian auctioneer), then all security
purchase rates would have to be set to constants in equilibrium. The possible equilibria would
then include ones with constant asset price trends, constant Y and the exchange rate that satisfies
the uncovered return parity (11) exactly.
                                                          
7 This is true since the shadow price parity index Y is residency-invariant: by switching superscripts d and f and
replacing P by 1/P, one sees that the foreign investor shadow price parity index is equal to 1/Y. Among other
things, the shadow price parity index is constant for foreign investors if and only if it is constant for domestic
ones. Recall that parity equation (11) was obtained by Itô-differentiating Y. Therefore, (11) holds regardless of
the country of residence, provided one corrects for the additional variance term in the disparity constant A. See
Derviz, 2002, for details of the uncovered total return parity model.Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   21
To analyze equilibria in the presence of dealers, it is useful to make a simplifying assumption
about the behavior of the asset market segments other than the forex. Specifically, assume that the
asset holdings x
d and x
f of every dealer and investor possess long-run average limit levels 
d x ,
f x . Each agent simply maintains the long-run average level of both asset holdings in the portfolio
by compensating, in the drift part, for their continuous attrition described by (5b) and (5d). Then
the optimal purchase rates v
d and v
f are positive constants:
d d d d a x v v   , 
f f f f a x v v   ,
making the asset holding processes revert to 
d x , 
f x  in the mean:
  dZ A x dt x x a dx
d d d d d d    ,    dZ A x dt x x a dx
f f f f f f    .
Regarding the price processes X
d and X
f, we shall assume that they have no trend (
d=
f=0).
The other three assumptions are aimed at limiting the long-run price trajectories in the forex to the
class of bounded ones. That is, attention is restricted to economies and equilibria with the
following properties:
a)  the exchange rate return drift is bounded from both sides;
b)  each of the earlier defined categories of market participants, namely dealers-domestic
residents, dealers-foreign residents, global investors and the local customer bases of each
dealer, is formed by agents with identical preferences and processing cost functions;
c)  the aggregate cumulative client currency supply and demand volumes generated by non-
dealer investors in both parts of the world have bounded drifts and are locally riskless (i.e.
contain no diffusions).
The benefit of the above restrictions is the existence of common upper and lower bounds for
individual inter-dealer orders v
i and, consequently, for individual parameters k
i as well.
Assumption b together with the no-diffusion assumption about the non-dealer aggregate I-
supplies/demands (the second part of assumption c) will be used in Section 4.
The optimal quote equations (7e), if combined with assumptions a–c, lead to a result about the
long-run behavior of the dealer quotes.

















In the above formula, the shadow price parity index Y is asymptotically a constant.22   Alexis Derviz
The necessity for Y to be almost constant is clear from the existence of upper and lower bounds
for k
i. The asymptote (12) itself results from substituting into (7e) the following expression for the











which follows immediately from (7b)–(7d).
The message of Proposition 1 is the existence of a strong link between the dealer’s behavior
towards his/her clients and the constraints coming from the inter-dealer market. Although it is
optimal for the dealer to maintain a positive spread between bid and ask quotes, the level at which
the mid-point between bid and ask is set is pinned down by the dealer’s shadow cash prices ratio.
The latter is tied to the shadow prices of domestic and foreign assets or, more specifically, to the
product of the last-observed FX clearing price and the shadow price parity index. In other words,
the shadow price parity index governs the “quote shading” in the model. This index is
fundamental-driven (cross-border asset return differential-driven) and is, therefore, competitively
determined by all dealers and other investors. Accordingly, no dealer has absolute monopoly
power over the clients.
5. Fundamental information extraction from the order flow
As is usual in client–dealer models of FX trade, dealers in the present setup are supposed to learn
from publicly observed events and the private signals contained in the order flow. In the present
model, the Bayesian character of belief updating is implied by the dealer optimization procedure
itself, as follows from the Girsanov theorem applied to the probability change in the optimal
control of diffusions (see Elliott, 1982, for details). However, an unambiguous prediction of the
exchange rate revision direction as a result of a particular news arrival and the corresponding
belief update is impossible without the exact specification of the filtering procedure applied by the
dealer. In this section, we obtain a more specific characterization of the equilibrium transaction
price by making a more specific assumption about the nature of beliefs and signals. As a result,
we will be able to formulate narrower results about the impact of belief changes regarding the
asset return and the aggregate I-funds flow on the dealer-investor actions.
In general, any Bayesian belief update in the present model must be characterized by a change in
the probability measure Pr that a dealer uses in the optimization problem (5), (6). Under the new
probability Pr*, process Z spanning the exogenous uncertainties of the economy is no longer
Brownian. There is another vector, Z*, of standard mutually independent Brownian motions under
Pr*, related to Z in accordance with the Girsanov theorem. Symbolically, the relation between Z
and Z* reads
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where h is an F-adapted process satisfying a number of regularity conditions. The equilibria of the
model can be associated with individual trajectories of h that generate the inter-dealer market
order flow trajectories, v
i, directed by purchasing dealers towards selling ones (see the dealer’s
decision problem in Subsection 3.1). Every h also generates the trajectories of the dealers’ bid and
ask quotes and, thereby, the client order flows.
To describe the exact formation mechanism of h, one needs to specify the filtering technique that
the agent uses when processing the observations. The most natural choice would be the Kalman–
Bucy filter. Equations (15)–(17) below list the basic properties of the dealer’s belief updating. The
beliefs themselves concern the exogenous variables’ drift terms after new information about the
current state of the economy has been registered and reflected in the customer order flow.
First, I shall posit the rule of client signal interpretation by the dealer. To do this, I introduce an
additional source of exogenous uncertainty into the model, the random process M of the
cumulative net outgoing purchases of foreign currency in the inter-dealer market by dealers –
domestic residents. In other words, M is a measure of the cumulative inter-dealer order flow from
M-residents to I-residents. The drift and diffusion coefficients of M are defined by
dM=mdt+dZ.
Given the homogeneity of the national dealer populations (assumption b of Section 4), we
conclude that m is formed by the summation of identical active inter-dealer trades v
i across the M-
resident dealers.
Let us define the observations process for the economy as a vector with components – the
individual sources of subjectively perceived uncertainty in the model, that is, define the vector









T. Symbolically, the evolution of Q will be
written as dQ=qdt+dZ. This is the dynamic under the objective probability Pr, utilized by those
who are able to identify the drift part qdt precisely. (To be able to identify , it is sufficient to
know only the values of Q across time, since, with this knowledge, the quadratic variation of Q
can be computed. The following assumption makes use of that fact.)
Assumption 2
Every dealer observes the current state of the system as expressed by Q correctly, and all dealers
agree upon the values of the diffusion coefficients . However, dealers have imprecise
information about the value of the drift term q. Consequently, an individual dealer’s information
filter  F
Q generated by Q (and completed to satisfy the usual conditions) is cruder than the
complete information filter F introduced in Section 3. Also, the dealer’s subjective probability
measure Pr
* differs from Pr.
As regards the first eight components of Q (I shall denote them by Q’), the assumption of their
observability by any dealer is plausible enough and does not require extended justification. On the
other hand, it might seem unnatural for a single domestic/foreign dealer to know exactly how
much I-currency his/her compatriot population has accumulated on aggregate. Assumption 2 is, in
fact, weaker. It only requires that a noisy signal comprising (a) the full list of diffusions spanning24   Alexis Derviz
the diffusion part of M, and (b) an imprecise measure of its drift, is received at every moment.
This is made possible by observations of the order flow, as explained below.
Let the components of vector Z of Brownian motions generating the risks of the economy be split
into part Z
Q which spans the observations process Q, and the independent part Z
w spanning the
unobserved states (responsible for the difference between F
Q and F). The dimension of Z
Q must be
equal to that of Q. Moreover, the law of motion of Q will only involve Z
Q, so that it can be written
as dQ=qdt+dZ
Q, with a non-singular diffusion matrix  satisfying the regularity conditions
needed for the Girsanov theorem to be applicable. Moreover, I assume that the last component of
Q, i.e. M, is observed through the random component  of the order flow received by the dealer
(as defined in Subsection 3.1). This means, among other things, that dis spanned by the totality
of the components of dZ
Q in a non-trivial way (i.e. the private order flow is disturbed by the full
range of the exchange rate-related uncertainty factors). It can be shown that d gives the dealer a
precise signal about the value of dM (although not about its statistics). Indeed, by summing up
transition equations (5c) for all domestic dealers, one arrives at the aggregate relationship
  cdt dt K X dr x dr x dx dM d
P
x f f f fT i iT iT
T





iT are total M- and I-holdings by the domestic dealer population. K
f is the total net
purchase rate of the foreign asset by domestic dealers (the sum of identical k
f terms across the
domestic dealer population). Finally, c is the net client sales rate of I to domestic dealers (there
are no diffusions in this aggregate rate according to assumption c of Section 4). Invoking
assumption b of the same section about investor homogeneity inside categories, we see that the
dealer knows both K
f (since he knows his own behavior) and c (which is equal to the sum of the
identical terms S(p
b)–D(p
a) across the trade partners of all the domestic dealers). This means that
d indeed signals dM. Equation (14) also shows that the diffusion part of d is spanned by the
same vector of Brownian motions as that of dQ. That is, the dealer transition equations (5) are
consistent with the dealer’s information being defined by F
Q, as stated in assumption 2.
Bayesian learning by the dealer
Vector q of drift coefficients of the observation process Q will be viewed as an Itô process w with
the law of motion

w bdZ dt w a a dw    1 0 (15)
under the objective probability. All coefficients are bounded F
Q-adapted processes, which, in
addition, may be non-trivial functions of time. This is the state process unobservable directly by
the dealer. Instead, each dealer has a belief about w, denoted by w  , which is a conditional
expectation of w given the dealer’s current information:   
Q
t t t F w E w   . This is an F
Q-adapted
process, with initial value  0 w 
 and the initial variance-covariance matrix 0 assumed to be given.Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   25
Put 
T B     . According to the properties of the Kalman–Bucy filter (see Liptser and Shiryaev,
1977, Ch. 12, for details), process w   satisfies the s.d.e.
  dt w dQ B dt w a a w d t t t t t
      
1
1 0 
    
Q T





             
(16)
under the objective probability Pr. The variance-covariance process  satisfies the deterministic
Riccati differential equation
   

        
1
1 1 B b b a a
dt
d T (17)
with initial condition 0.
By subtracting (15) from (16), one obtains the s.d.e. for the dealer’s estimation error:
    
w Q T
bdZ dZ dt w w a B w w d          
  1
1
1     . (18)
This error is a martingale under Pr and, if matrix B
-1–a1 is stable, then with time, the subjective
estimate becomes closer to the true value of w in the mean.
Recall that we assume identical dealers within each nation, and let the size of the M-resident
dealer population be normalized to unity. Then, in equilibrium, the optimal outgoing inter-dealer
trade by the domestic dealer, v
i, must satisfy the trivial market clearing condition
t
i
t m v  
for all t, where the dealer’s subjective estimate of the aggregate mean rate of active I-purchases
from non-residents, m  , is the last component of the conditional expectation w   of the unobserved
state process w (under the given information structure, the dealer solves the optimization problem
from Section 4 under probability Pr* instead of Pr, and all the processes he works with are F
Q-
projections of the objective F-adapted processes).































According to the assumptions of Section 4, k
d and k
f are constants. Further, the term  (which is
related to the shadow price parity index Y) is an Itô process with differential equal to the total
return differential dR
d-dR
f plus a covariance term c
0dt dependent only on the components of26   Alexis Derviz
observations covariance matrix . By assuming the linear-quadratic search cost function k given
in Subsection 3.1, we are able to formulate the principle result of the paper.
Proposition 2 (Dealer-based uncovered total return parity) The instantaneous exchange rate
return in an inter-dealer FX market with imperfect dealer information about the drift terms of the
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 is the last row of the diffusion matrix   
T 1      from (16).
Equation (19) describes the generalized uncovered total return parity in an equilibrium with
asymmetric dealer information and Bayesian learning from the order flow signal. Here, the first
three terms on the right-hand side represent the standard UTRP, while the last three terms are a
deviation from the UTRP, which we call disparity (also known as the country premium in
international finance). The main difference compared to standard uncovered parity formulae is the
presence of the term containing the dealer-perceived trend of the cross-border order flow,  m d  .
The latter can be split into dm, the full-information law of motion of m, and the error term
 m m d  
, given by the last row of (18).
Even under full symmetric information about the cross-border order flow statistics, (19) shows
why the exchange rate behavior may frequently deviate from the uncovered parity rule. Any
liquidity-induced movement in the aggregate order flow trend m leads to an additional component
in the observed country premium. For instance, if non-residents accelerate their purchases of I,
generating a positive shift of m, the I-currency appreciates more than prescribed by the uncovered
parity. When, in addition, the dealers are imperfectly informed about m, even the aforementioned
liquidity-adjusted UTRP is violated (see the example below). Formally, the term in (19)
containing    m m d  
 creates an additional individually perfectly rational disparity. Both effects
would be impossible in a purely Walrasian FX market.
The dealer-based generalized UTRP (19) indicates that the non-stationary disparity term behavior
corresponds to a period when the aggregate cross-border inter-dealer order flow dM has a non-
zero time-dependent drift parameter m. By collecting all the diffusion parameter terms in a single
(close to constant) term c
1, one can rewrite (19) as
m k
m d k







    . (20)
Even if one ignores the difference between objective m and the dealer’s subjective m  , a non-zero
aggregate I-purchase or I-sale pressure resulting in a non-trivial dynamic of m is able to generate
a temporary UTRP-deviation. Let us assume that the true law of motion of m is given by the
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck equationComponents of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   27
m m bdZ mdt a dm    , (21)
with a
m>0, i.e. m reverts to zero on average. Then (20) renders a perfectly intuitive result of the
domestic currency (M) depreciating relative to the national asset return differential when
residents give up M in favor of I (m positive), and appreciating relative to this differential when
residents give up I and accumulate M (m negative).
The cross-border inter-dealer order flow is able to explain UTRP-deviations in both the symmetric
and asymmetric information cases. An important distinction of the asymmetric information case is
that, differently from (21), the subjective drift parameter m   is no longer a martingale. This is why
it is more natural to associate the persistence of the non-stationary disparity term with the dealers’
Bayesian information-acquisition at a finite speed, as described by (16), (17).
The remaining disparity not explained by the combination of (20) and (21) can be conjectured to
come from the asymmetric information phenomena outlined at the beginning of this section. In
this case, (19) must be invoked in full generality, including the difference between m and m  .
Then the corresponding dynamic equilibrium becomes explicitly dependent on the dealers’
learning process. One comes to three general conclusions about the properties of these asymmetric
information equilibria:
a)  At times when new information about the aggregate order flow (dM) is being processed by
the dealers, the disparity term is a non-trivial and seemingly non-stationary process. If the
arrival of new information is a one-time event, the drift component of the disparity eventually
disappears.
b)  The volatilities of both the exchange rate itself and the disparity term in the generalized
UTRP equation should be higher under asymmetric information than in a forex market with
fully informed dealers.
c)  The arrival of a new order flow signal induces a change in a dealer’s perceived covariance
structure of the drifts of fundamental variables (matrix ). Therefore, new information can
have a permanent or, at least, very long-lived effect on the perceived dynamic of the
aggregate order flow drift (process m  ) and, thereby, on the disparity/country premium level.
The empirically observed revisions of the country premium are explained in the model as a
consequence of a revised interpretation of the order flow statistics monitored by the dealers.
Among the asymmetric information equilibria described in this section, there are many with
sunspot properties. The reason is the self-fulfilling nature of the beliefs about process m. This fact
can be illustrated by an example where dealers have perfect information about the statistics of all
components of Q except M.
Example: imprecise knowledge of the aggregate order flow only
To treat this case, it is convenient to consider components Q’ as exogenous parameters of the
model, so that (redefined) processes Q=M and w=m have dimension 1. Covariance parameters a0,
a1, b, , are now scalars. Let the true average trend of the inter-dealer order flow be a
martingale of the (21) type. In such an economy, fully informed dealers would have generated a28   Alexis Derviz
forex market with the UTRP satisfied exactly up to an additional random error term dependent on
b.
Incompletely informed dealers must learn the true value of m from the order flow observations.
The innovation of their beliefs about m is described by the scalar s.d.e.
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  , which never
vanishes unless the diffusion parameter b in the s.d.e. for m is zero. That is, the dynamic of m 
never fully converges to that of m. The coefficient 
m b





Suppose that the true initial value of m is zero, but the subjective initial belief of the representative
domestic dealer happens to be  0 0  m 
. Then, from (22) we conclude that  m d   tends to be
negative (the exchange rate movements are more downward sloping than prescribed by the
UTRP). Equations (18) and (19) in this case tell us that at such times, the dealer’s subjective
shadow value of the exchange rate is more often higher than the true value, inducing him to
initiate I-purchases in the inter-dealer market and, thereby, validate his beliefs. Put differently, the
belief that everyone else is purchasing I makes him purchase it as well (the herding effect). The
dynamic of P in (19) is that of the downward adjustment of the exchange rate after the initial
“overshooting” move immediately after the formation of the prior belief  0 0  m 
. In addition, on
average,  dm m d  
, i.e. the partially informed dealer “overreacts” to the news about the current
movement in the FX market, generating a higher volatility registered by outside observers.
The above example dealt with an extreme case of self-fulfilling beliefs in the inter-dealer market,
while the dealers, possessing the maximum possible knowledge of other variables, had no
incentive to correct their biased estimates of the aggregate inter-dealer order flow sufficiently. If
the estimate update involves other macro state variables as well, one can expect that the sunspot
effects in the m-variable will be mitigated.Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   29
6. Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of optimizing FX dealers who use the received order flow to
improve their knowledge of fundamentals in a Bayesian manner. The model reflects a number of
typical features of spot trading in the Czech koruna. It combines the traditional logic of
international macroeconomics with techniques of continuous time finance and forex
microstructure theory. The latter originally declared the intention to deal with exchange rate
formation in terms that could be recognized by financial market practitioners, as opposed to
textbook macroeconomic lessons, which are rarely reflected accurately by FX traders. The
problem is especially urgent in the eyes of the monetary authority, whose very raison d’être is the
presumed ability to implement a desired macroeconomic objective through actions taken in the
money and FX markets. However, the best-known microstructure models currently available
operate with conceptual shortcuts and information-theoretic constructions that make their
messages even more, not less, distant from the dealer-room language than the standard
propositions of classroom macroeconomics.
8 An additional problem is to derive from any of these
models an empirically meaningful corollary testable on the available data. The present paper
makes a step in this direction by offering evidence that the cross-border order flow in the Czech
koruna/euro spot market is able to explain a part of the CZK risk premium. This might be a useful
lesson for any macro model of the Czech economy containing an exchange rate equation with a
risk premium. Indeed, certain entries in the balance of payments financial account, serving as a
proxy for the FX order flow from non-residents to residents, can help to explain the observed
deviations of the exchange rate from the uncovered parity trajectory.
The paper has demonstrated that the long-term “macro” factors influencing the exchange rate and
the short-term dissemination of information about these factors among FX dealers and investors
can be handled within a common continuous time portfolio optimization model. The properties of
equilibria in this model account for:
1)  the uncovered asset return parity of the exchange rate and its generalizations,
2)  the existence of variable stochastic spreads in a competitive multi-dealer environment,
3)  the concentration of individual dealer ask and bid quotes around a commonly observed
clearing price,
4)  dealer learning about changing fundamentals from private and inter-dealer trades, in the
course of which new information processing can cause deviations from the uncovered parity
of total returns for the exchange rate,
5)  permanent changes in the disparity constant (country premium) as a result of switching
between self-fulfilling beliefs about the statistics of the inter-dealer order flow.
                                                          
8 This is the author’s experience from dealing room conversations in a number of commercial and reserve banks.
The conclusion is, not surprisingly, that dealers are usually well versed in the uncovered interest rate parity
argument (and even know that it does not hold). They can also easily comment on the signal impact of fresh data
about inflation or GDP on the exchange rate. It is, however, totally unrealistic to expect a dealer to analyze the
separating-versus-pooling nature of equilibrium in the trader–specialist game of Easley and O’Hara, 1987, or
Glosten, 1989. Scholars may use the latter models to analyze the actions of real dealerships, but not to
communicate with them.30   Alexis Derviz
As was argued in Section 5, a change in self-fulfilling beliefs about the inter-dealer order flow can
result from the arrival of new information about the drift and the covariance matrix of the
unobserved state process. This information is most likely to improve the currently available one,
and only exceptionally produce a totally new pattern of co-movements between the fundamental
characteristics of the economy such as productivity, asset returns and the term structure of interest
rates. Thus, if one excludes extreme overhauls of the long-term structural dependencies in the
economy, the order flow effects described in this paper are unlikely to have a permanent impact
on the exchange rate. On the other hand, this impact may be very long-lasting, owing to the finite
speed of learning by the agents. On the empirical side, the persistence of order flow-caused effects
is confirmed by sufficiently long episodes of deviation of the observed exchange rates from the
uncovered total return parity.Components of the Czech Koruna Risk Premium in a Multiple-Dealer FX Market   31
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Appendix:  The Maximum Principle solution of the dealer problem in
continuous time
The following results utilize the adjoint equation techniques in stochastic optimal control of
diffusions pioneered by Bismut, 1976, and Hausmann, 1981, and further developed in Peng, 1990,
and Cadenillas and Karatzas, 1995.
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, ( A 1 )
with respect to controls , subject to the state-transition equation
dZ X dt X dX ) , ( ) , (       , (A2)
the value X0 of the state process at time t=0 being given. The state process X is a vector with n
components, and Z is a vector of d mutually independent standard Brownian motions. B is the so-
called final bequest function. Its present value must possess a limit if the time horizon of the




t d     is the discount factor between
periods t and s.
The problem (A1), (A2) can be solved by forming the current value Hamiltonian
 )) , ( ( ) , ( ) , , , , ,     X tr X X U X t            ( H ,
which is to be maximized with respect to  t  . Here,  and  are the first- and second-order adjoint
processes ( is of the same dimension n as X and  is an nxd-matrix), with    x D     along the
optimal path. When state X stands for asset holdings, the adjoint process  can be called the
shadow price vector of the corresponding group of assets.
Let [f,g] define the predictable co-variation of diffusion processes f and g, and put
  dt g f g f d , ,   (with the standard shorthand  f  for  f f , ). Then the (first-order) adjoint
process  satisfies the stochastic differential equation
 Udt D dt A dA dt d X      n 1    , ( A 3 )34   Alexis Derviz
with the nxn-matrix valued process A defined by
dA=DXdt+DXdZ, A0=1n.
The final condition T=DXB(T,XT), or an appropriate transversality condition if T=, must be
added to (A3). The adjoint process  can also be described as the X-gradient of the value function
of the problem (A1), (A2), provided the latter is differentiable.
In the investor-dealer problem of Section 2, the state-transition equation (A2) is linear in the state
variable x. Therefore, the coefficient matrix A and its quadratic variation  A  for this transition
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The previous two matrix expressions, if substituted into equation (A3), render the adjoint equation
system (6) of Section 2.
To derive the expression for the Hamiltonian of the dealer problem, one needs to calculate the
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and the part of the Hamiltonian containing the first-order adjoint process is obtained by scalar
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i.e. it does not contain the control variables. In short, maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to
the controls of the dealer problem is equivalent to maximizing the expression
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0
b b a a i d d p S p p D p v Pk v k X        ) ( ) ( ) (
b a f f i




d v v        0 .
This maximization is fully described by the first-order conditions
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that we use in Subsection 4.2 of the main text.CNB Working Papers Series
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